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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE Q:F UTAH 
srrArrE. OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
GEORGE L. TILLMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9562 
BRIEF OF RESP'ONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The appellant, George L. Tillman, also known as 
Spike Jones, was convicted of grand larceny (78-36-1 
through 4, Utah Code Annotated 1953) and second de-
gree burglary (76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953) in 
Third Judicial District Court and sentenced on each crime 
with the sentences directed, to run concurrently. Appel-
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court, upon conviction of defendant of 
grand larceny and second degree burglary, sentenced de-
fendant upon each crime, sentences to run concurrently. 
No further action was taken subsequent to this action 
except the instant appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have so much of the sentence 
as applies to the crime of grand larceny vacated. The 
respondent, State of Utah, contends the court should 
affirm, and deny the relief sought. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent adopts the facts as set out in the ap-
pellant's brief as being essentially correct. The only issue 
raised on appeal is whether the crime of grand larceny 
and second degree burglary may be separately punished 
by individual sentences where the two crimes arise out 
of the same total transaction. 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
PoiNT I. 
THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY SEN-
TENCED ON BOTH THE GRAND LARCENY 
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY SEN-
TENCED ON BOTH THE GRAND LARCENY 
AND SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY 
COUNTS. 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
sentencing him for both larceny and burglary where 
the burglary and larceny arose from the same total 
transaction. 
The information under which the appellant was tried 
lists two counts : Count One being for the crime of bur-
glary, second degree, and Count Two for grand larceny, 
both crimes being charged as having occurred at the same 
time and place (R. 8). The facts show that the burglary 
preceded the larceny in that appellant, being an accom-
plice to the actual burglary and larceny, stood by in' a 
truck, while his co-principals first entered the building 
and then removed property therefrom. 
At the outset, it is noted that 77-21-31, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, provides: 
''The information or indictment must charge but 
one offense, but the same offense may be set forth 
in different forms under different counts ; and 
when the offense may be committed by the use of 
different means, the means may be alleged in the 
alternative in the same count; provided, * * * that 
an information or indictment for burglary may 
contain a count for housebreaking and one for lar-
ceny, and an information or indictment for house-
breaking may contain a count for larceny; * * * '' 
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Section 77-21-32, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is to be 
read with the above cited provision and states: 
''The defendant or defendants, or any of them, 
may be convicted of any offense charged in any 
of the counts joined as prescribed in the next pre-
ceding section; provided, that no person shall be 
convicted of more than one crime upon the same 
facts constituting such crime.'' 
It appears, therefore, that if a person is tried upon 
joint counts, he may not be convicted of more than one 
crime if the same facts constitute the different crimes. 
The appellant, in contending the court should not 
affirm the sentence on the larceny count, relies upon 
76-1-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The key phrase of 
this statute which prohibits multiple punishments for the 
same act, is the wording which states : ''An act or omis-
sion which is punishable in different ways * * *. '' Sections 
77-21-32, and 76-1-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, should 
be construed in conjunction with each other, since it would 
be an absurdity to allow a conviction but provide that an 
accused could not be sentenced upon the conviction. Since 
both provisions are related to the same general subject 
matter, they should be construed consistently or in pari 
materia. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., 
Sec. 5202. 
It is submitted that the construction of the above 
statutes is consistent with the sentencing of an accused 
on both the count of larceny and burglary arising from 
the same total transaction. Generally, separate sentences 
may be imposed on each count of an indictment where 
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different offenses are charged. Thus, as is noted in 24 
C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1567, p. 37: 
''As a general rule, where accused enters a plea of 
guilty or is convicted by a general verdict or 
otherwise on several counts of an indictment 
charging separate and distinct offenses although 
of the same character, he may be subjected to 
separate punishments * * *.'' 
To the same effect is that statement in 15 Am. Jur., 
Criminal Law, Sec. 451, where it is said: 
"Unless otherwise provided by a statute, a de-
fendant who pleads guilty or is convicted under 
an indictment charging two distinct offenses may 
be punished for both.'' 
See also 9 Am. Jur., Burglary, Sec. 83, 31 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 727. 
In the instant case, there is no question but that 
larceny and burglary are distinct and separate offenses. 
The elements of one are not the same as the elements of 
the other. The same facts nor the same acts or omissions 
do not give rise to both crimes. Larceny takes over where 
burglary leaves off. Section 76-1-23, U. C. A. 1953, re-
quires that the same act or omission be punishable in 
the same way; but the acts constituting burglary will 
not justify a conviction for larceny, and vice versa. 
The appellant has cited several early federal cases to 
the effect that a sentence cannot be imposed for both 
burglary and larceny where they arise from the same 
totality of circumstance. It is noted that these cases pre-
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ceded the decision in Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632 
(1915), where the United States Supreme Court said: 
''But the test is not whether the criminal intent 
is one and the same and inspiring the whole trans-
action, but whether separate acts ha.ve been com-
mitted with the requisite criminal intent and are 
such as made punishable by act of Congress.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
The court there upheld the sentencing of the accused for 
both the breaking and entering of a post office and larceny 
therefrom. 
The subsequent federal cases cited by appellant are 
not concerned with the specific issue now before the court, 
nor as here where we have two separate statutes. The 
cases cited by the appellant for the most part involve vio-
lations of a single statute, making several things crimi-
nal. Even so, the rule set down in Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U. S. 296 (1932), is still applicable to cases 
like that of the instant situation. 1 In the Blockburger 
case, the court set the test for multiplicity of sentence as 
follows: 
"The applicable rule is that where the same act 
or transaction constitutes a violation of two dis-
tinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only 
one, is whether each provision requires proof of an 
additional fact which the other does not.'' 
There is, therefore, no inconsistency between the 
federal position and the position advocated by the State 
1 See Gore v. United States, 35 7 U. S. 386 (1958) and Harris v. United 
States, 359 U. S. 19 (1959), where the United States Supreme Court adhered 
to the Blockburger rule. 
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and applied by the trial court, since burglary and lar-
ceny require the proof of separate elements. 
It is submitted that the trial court acted properly 
and in direct accord with the previous decisions of this 
Court. In fVilkinson v. Harr,is, 109 U. 76, 163 P. 2d 1023 
( 1945), the accused sought release on habeas corpus 
because he had been charged in one information with 
both burglary and larceny, and sentenced on both counts. 
The court denied the writ, holding that since he had not 
completed the sentence on either count, his application 
was premature. A little over a year later, the same con-
tention as is raised in the instant case and was sought 
to be raised in the Wilkinson case was before the Utah 
Supreme Court. In Rogerson v. Harris, 111 Utah 330, 
178 P. 2d 397 (1947), a writ of habeas corpus was sought 
by petitioner on the grounds that he was improperly con-
victed of larceny and third degree burglary, and sen-
tenced to consecutive sentences on both counts; and that 
he had served his sentence for burglary, he should be 
freed. The court rejected the contention. It noted that 
the statute, that is now 77-21-31, U. C. A. 1953, allows 
joinder of the offenses in the information and that what 
is now 77-21-32, U. C. A. 1953, prohibits conviction if 
the crimes are based upon the same facts. The court 
stated: 
'' * '" * The clear meaning of Section 105-21-32 
[77-21-32, U. C. A. 1953] is that a defendant may 
be found guilty of more than one offense charged 
in the same information unless the same facts con-
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"Do the same facts in this case constitute the 
crimes of burglary in the third degree and grand 
larceny? 
''Burglary in the third degree is defined as : 'Ev-
ery person who, in the daytime, enters any dwell-
ing house * * * or other building, * * * with intent 
to steal or to commit any felony whatever therein, 
is guilty of burglary in the third degree.' Section 
103-9-5, U. C. A. 1943. 
"Larceny is defined as: 'Larceny is the felonious 
stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away 
the personal property of another.' Section 103-
36-1, U. C. A. 1943. 
''The crime of burglary was perpetrated by the 
plaintiff's entering the garage with intent to steal. 
Had he been interrupted and prevented from tak-
ing the car, or, after entering, had he changed his 
mind and decided not to take the automobile he 
still would have committed the crime of burglary. 
"Larceny requires no 'entering.' The crime is 
accomplished merely by taking the personal prop-
erty of another with intent to steal. 
''In this case burglary and larceny arose out of 
the same total transaction but the proof of the bur-
glary stopped when the proof of the larceny start-
ed. Entirely different facts constitute the different 
crimes of which the plaintiff was found guilty. 
The same facts therefore do not constitute the two 
crimes joined but different facts constitute differ-
ent crimes. Conviction of the two crimes were 
therefore not prohibited by Section 105-21-32, 
U. C. A.1943." (178 P. 2d at 399.) 
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rrhe court also noted that the sentences on the crimes, 
which were consecutive and for both larceny and bur-
glary, were proper. The court said: 
''The plaintiff was legally charged with burglary 
and grand larceny. The convictions and sentences 
for the two crimes were regular. He is being de-
tained in the state prison by virtue of those sen-
tences." (Emphasis added) 
Although the court did not refer to 76-1-23, U. C. A. 
1953, it did decide that the crimes of burglary and lar-
ceny are not patterned on the same facts and, hence, 
not the same act or omission, and that separate sen-
tences for each are proper. Thus, the Harris case, it is 
submitted, is dispositive of the instant appeal. 
The position of the Utah court appears in accord 
with the greater majority of cases from other jurisdic-
tions as well. In Willia.ms v. State, 109 A. 2d 89 (Md. 
1954), the :Maryland Court of Appeals said: 
''In Eyer v. Warden, 197 Md. 690, 80 A. 2d 19, 
Judge Delaplaine said for the Court: 'Consecutive 
sentences, if certain and definite, are valid, where 
the accused is convicted of separate and distinct 
crimes charged in different indictments or in dif-
ferent counts of the same indictmen.t.' (Emphasis 
supplied) We have held that a count of breaking 
and entering and a count of larceny may be joined 
in the same indictment. Debinski v. State, 194 Md. 
355, 71 A. 2d 460; Bowser v. State, supra. The 
finding of the jury as to guilt on both the first and 
second counts was a finding that separate crimes 
had been committed. This trial court could, there-
fore, in its discretion impose separate punish-
ments, within statutory limits.'' 
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Other decisions from the same state appear to support 
the rule. Johnson v. State, 164 A. 2d 917 (Md. 1961); 
Young v. State, 151 A. 2d 140 (Md. 1959). 
In State v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P. 2d 187 (1960), 
the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the same argument 
as is now urged by appellant and did so while consider-
ing the effect of A. R. S., Sec. 13-1641, which is th same 
as 76-1-23, U. C. A. 1953. The court said: 
"The above statute covers a situation where the 
same act is punishable in different ways under 
different sections of the law. Under such a situa-
tion, he can be punished for only one offense. Bur-
glary and theft are two separate and distinct acts. 
To constitute burglary, it is not necessary that 
theft be committed.'' 
To the same effect are Wya.tt v. Alvis, 136 N. E. 2d 726 
(Ohio App. 1957); State v. Trunzo, 137 N. E. 2d 511 
(Ohio App. 1957); Kuklich v. Baldi, 150 Pa. Super. 390, 
28 A. 2d 496 (1942); State v. Byra, 128 N.J. L. 429, 26 A. 
2d 702 (1942) ; People v. M orhous, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 274 
(1946); Robinson v. Com1nonwealth, 190 Va. 134, 56 S. E. 
2d 367 (1949); Copeland v. Manning, 109 S. E. 2d 361 
(S. C. 1959); Sharp v. State,. 61 Neb. 187, 85 N. W. 38; 
People v. Guarino, 132 Cal. App. 2d 554, 282 P. 2d 538 
(1955); People v. Macias, 161 Cal. App. 2d 594, 326 P. 
2d 936 (1958). 
Substantial reasons exist for the precedents, since 
different values are concerned in each crime (see 100 U. 
of Pa. L. Rev. 411 [1952]) ; and where both are involved, 
the result is more serious than if just one crime were 
10 
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present. In Fnitcd States v. Mayo, 26 C. M. R. 627 
(1958), pn. denied, 27 C. l\L R. 512, the court rejected 
the ''single transaction'' and ''continuous impulse'' tests 
as being not applicable to the crimes of housebreaking 
and larceny. The court said: 
''It is our opinion that none of the rules or tests 
enunciated briefly above are, or should be, deter-
minative of the case at hand. It is unthinkable 
that a housebreaking should be determined to be 
multiplicious with a separate and further offense 
committed after the housebreaking has been ef-
fected. So to hold would be an invitation to further 
criminal offense.'' 
It is submitted that the contention of the appellant 
IS unmeritorious both on the basis of Utah precedent 
and upon other authority. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that appellant's argument, having 
been laid to rest before by the court, need not now be 
interred since the social values sought to be protected 
at the time of Rogerson v. Harris are still the social 
values of the present day. It is recognized that even if 
the appellant's initial premise were sound, the question 
of the effect of the sentences upon the collective mind of 
the Board of Pardons may not be ripe for judicial inves-
tigation; but since the initial position of appellant is not 
based upon a correct rationale, that issue need not be met. 
11 
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It is submitted that the court should affirm both 
sentences. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Deputy Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
12 
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